Under Secretary Pickering supports manual eradication of coca
Tlahui-Politic 10 II/2000. Información enviada a Mario Rojas, Director de Tlahui. USA, a 2 de Diciembre, 2000. Under Secretary Pickering supports manual eradication of coca.
I found three interesting things in Under Secretary Pickering's
recent press briefing in Washington:
* the US now supports manual coca eradication as an alternative
to fumigation. This is a reversal in our position.
* neither Thomas Pickering or Harold Koh would comment on an
alleged meeting between Carlos Castaño and the DEA. In a press
conference in Colombia several months ago, General McCaffrey
also declined to comment about this, and promised that his office
would investigate the allegations.
* neighboring countries will have bilateral alliances with the US,
rather than taking a regional approach. (Monroe Doctrine)
Paul
Exerpts from "Under Secretary Pickering on his Recent Trip to
Colombia"
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/drugs/00112802.htm
27 November 2000
[manual eradication]
Q: There was a report last week in the press that said it had
interviews with a variety of farmers in Colombia, especially in the
Southwestern portion, in which they said maybe they would give
up coca for a brief period of time, but their concern is that the
government in the past hasn't anted up when it said it would, and
that perhaps they might also continue to cultivate coca on the side.
Are you concerned at all that it will be difficult to, short of spraying,
to get rid of all the coca plants?
UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: What, of course, is part of the
strategy is a two-pronged effort in the South: one, to have aerial
spraying take place in large areas with low density of population,
the so-called industrial cocaine-producing areas, large fields; the
second is the program that I emphasized in my prepared remarks,
the notion that with a combination of security, alternative economic
development across the board -- that is, alternative crops, schools,
housing if necessary, infrastructure for local governments, roads
and so on -- as well as a commitment manually to eradicate their
fields, checked of course by the government, it would be a real
opportunity to take the people who have expressed concern about
the commitment of the government and their ability to see this
through to work with them to achieve that objective.
If that doesn't work, of course it has been made clear that after a
period of time the government still has the opportunity to resort to
aerial spraying if that's necessary to eradicate the crop. But
because these people have come forward and begun to discuss
with the government commitments and formal agreements to carry
out these kinds of activities, we think it's far better to work with
those people, keep them on the land, get them involved in
producing crops that can be marketable on a long-term basis.
And the fascinating thing is that most of those people have made it
very clear, when you ask them, "Do you want your kids to be
involved in this business?" And they say no, they would like out.
Q: Very quickly, one follow-up and then one other question. Is
there a time table for the Pastrana plan to give alternative aid?
UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: Yes. There are in a sense now
going forward, as we speak, efforts to develop a series and the
first stage of pilot projects in the South. The hope is that if they go
forward and can be protected by the same military that the
previous question objected -- or made clear people had objections
to over in the Congress, then of course it will be able to be
expanded. But the initial efforts are always the tough ones. It's not
possible to set arbitrary time deadlines, but the first phase at least
is thinking of doing as much of this as possible in the next year.
Q: In the many months since the various targets and goals of this
program were laid out, the situation on the ground, particularly in
Southern Colombia, has changed substantially. There are,
according to U.S. officials as well as Colombian officials, many
more FARC and AUC members there with heavier armament. At the
same time, the program -- the alternative development program --
has been shrunk by the Colombian Government from what they
originally envisioned its first stages to be. And other than a few
very isolated places, there aren't contracts signed and there have
not been actual facts on the ground to speak of.
UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: No, all of that is true. The real
elements of this that are important to keep in mind is that, as a
result of the increased presence of both the AUC and the FARC,
both of whom happen to be fighting with each other, the
government has increased its presence very significantly on the
ground. There is no question at all that pilot programs were
envisaged to be beginning about now, late November/early
December. That has not been delayed.
But the presence of the armed units of the guerrillas and the
paramilitaries is going to make it more difficult to start more than
a few pilot projects. The government was enthusiastic that there
would be no armed opposition. We, in our own judgments in the
United States, were less convinced, unfortunately. I say
unfortunately because it doesn't help that we turn out to be right
and they have turned out to be wrong. But it was all
comprehended in the planning process that this particular
alternative would be one that we would have to face, and we are
now facing it.
[Castaño DEA]
Q: I'd like to ask you a question about AUC paramilitary leader
Carlos Castaño. There were two incidents that occurred this year
involving U.S. officials that perhaps you could clarify.
One, earlier this year, two DEA special agents in Miami were
suspended from active duty over allegations, including that they
allegedly met with Carlos Castaño, and both the DEA informant as
well as Castaño both claim that the DEA agents are trying to enlist
his support in order to negotiate plea bargain agreements with
Colombian traffickers.
Also, in October of this year, State Department official Phil Chicola
made remarks in Bogotá that were different in tone and substance
of remarks previously made by Secretary Harold Koh vis-à-vis
Castaño when Chicola said that the United States supported the
Castaño demand for the president of Colombia to include Castaño
in peace talks with his administration.
Could you please clarify U.S. policy vis-à-vis Castaño, and tell us
whether or not US officials have had contact with him and, if so,
whether that contact was approved by Washington?
UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: Policy is no contact, no dealing.
The report I know about of the DEA agents -- I don't know whether
they actually met. I can't confirm it. If they had met -- and I can't
confirm it -- it would be totally contrary to our policy. I believe Mr.
Chicola was seriously misinterpreted. Mr. Koh is here if he wants
to explain the policy. I believe I have explained it.
If you want to add anything, feel free, Harold.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY KOH: I feel affirmed. (Laughter.)
Q: Does the United States support Castaño's demand to be
included in peace talks with the president?
UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: No.
[bilateral alliances]
Q: I'm a bit confused, Ambassador, about what you envision for a
regional approach to this problem, and what is on the table at this
time. In my experience, speaking with officials from these
countries, as Jesus pointed out, there is a broad skepticism that
we are hearing, and I'm wondering if you are hearing a different
message. And what specifically are you talking about here? Are
we talking about some kind of a regional military alliance? What
are we looking at here in terms of the broader strategy?
UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: I think that you must first take a
look at the fact that the regional effort, the $180 million, is primarily
focused on counter-narcotics activities. Over $100 million in
Bolivia, I think 32 million to Peru, 18 million to a group of other
countries, including Panama and Ecuador and others. And the idea
obviously is in each country to develop a series of programs.
If alternative development and manual eradiation will do the job,
fine. If interdiction is required to stop the trafficking, to drive down
the production and the process and the price eventually, we can
use that. So these programs will be scaled and tuned to the needs
and the potential needs of each of these countries. And I believe,
as we go through these, we will be in a position to announce and
give you more details on each of them.
In Peru and Bolivia, we have had traditional programs for a long
period of time, and you can assume the additional funds will be
used in general to support those traditional programs.
Q: But this is a bilateral approach that's --
UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: It's correctly --
Q: -- through the United States, not regional.
UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: It's a bilateral approach with
the United States with each of the countries, not the creation of a
large, multilateral consortium. And as far as I know now, there will
be not the same emphasis on military as there is in Colombia
because the problem is not the same yet as it is in Colombia.
...
Q: Just to follow up on the third question. You said in your opening
remarks that there had been a lot of thinking going on, as far as
making the regional program the centerpiece of next year's effort,
and I wasn't clear from your response whether you're intending
some kind of different effort from the one you just outlined in terms
of what is already in the supplemental.
UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: I think that, as we look at it, we
understand that with the increased effort in Colombia, the potential
for the balloon effect increases. And therefore the need in the
surrounding and nearby áreas is going to increase, and therefore
enlargement of the programs through increased funding in a
regional effort, but focused bilaterally in each country, is probably
going to be necessary. And that is what informs our thinking in
current budget planning.
Exerpt from "U.S. Drug Policy Director McCafffey Speaks on
Colombia"
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/drugs/00112804.htm
28 November 2000
Colombia's drug elimination plan has a high potential for success
in the first phase because drug production is concentrated in the
south and vulnerable to eradication. In the long term, Plan Colombia
will succeed because it works at the village and farm cooperative
level to introduce programs to support the evolution away from a
drug economy. These programs include infrastructure development
for marketing legitimate crops and technical assistance for the
grass-roots organizations that contract for a program of verified
voluntary coca reduction. This approach was successful in Peru
and Bolivia once those countries could provide basic security for
the civilian programs and there was a reasonable threat of
eradication without compensation for organizations that fail to
keep their promises to eliminate drug crops.
From: Paul Wolf paulwolf@icdc.com
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