Under Secretary Pickering supports manual eradication of coca

Tlahui-Politic 10 II/2000. Información enviada a Mario Rojas, Director de Tlahui. USA, a 2 de Diciembre, 2000. Under Secretary Pickering supports manual eradication of coca.

I found three interesting things in Under Secretary Pickering's recent press briefing in Washington:

* the US now supports manual coca eradication as an alternative to fumigation. This is a reversal in our position.

* neither Thomas Pickering or Harold Koh would comment on an alleged meeting between Carlos Castaño and the DEA. In a press conference in Colombia several months ago, General McCaffrey also declined to comment about this, and promised that his office would investigate the allegations.

* neighboring countries will have bilateral alliances with the US, rather than taking a regional approach. (Monroe Doctrine)

Paul

Exerpts from "Under Secretary Pickering on his Recent Trip to Colombia"
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/drugs/00112802.htm
27 November 2000
[manual eradication]

Q: There was a report last week in the press that said it had interviews with a variety of farmers in Colombia, especially in the Southwestern portion, in which they said maybe they would give up coca for a brief period of time, but their concern is that the government in the past hasn't anted up when it said it would, and that perhaps they might also continue to cultivate coca on the side.

Are you concerned at all that it will be difficult to, short of spraying, to get rid of all the coca plants?

UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: What, of course, is part of the strategy is a two-pronged effort in the South: one, to have aerial spraying take place in large areas with low density of population, the so-called industrial cocaine-producing areas, large fields; the second is the program that I emphasized in my prepared remarks, the notion that with a combination of security, alternative economic development across the board -- that is, alternative crops, schools, housing if necessary, infrastructure for local governments, roads and so on -- as well as a commitment manually to eradicate their fields, checked of course by the government, it would be a real opportunity to take the people who have expressed concern about the commitment of the government and their ability to see this through to work with them to achieve that objective.

If that doesn't work, of course it has been made clear that after a period of time the government still has the opportunity to resort to aerial spraying if that's necessary to eradicate the crop. But because these people have come forward and begun to discuss with the government commitments and formal agreements to carry out these kinds of activities, we think it's far better to work with those people, keep them on the land, get them involved in producing crops that can be marketable on a long-term basis.

And the fascinating thing is that most of those people have made it very clear, when you ask them, "Do you want your kids to be involved in this business?" And they say no, they would like out.

Q: Very quickly, one follow-up and then one other question. Is there a time table for the Pastrana plan to give alternative aid? UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: Yes. There are in a sense now going forward, as we speak, efforts to develop a series and the first stage of pilot projects in the South. The hope is that if they go forward and can be protected by the same military that the previous question objected -- or made clear people had objections to over in the Congress, then of course it will be able to be expanded. But the initial efforts are always the tough ones. It's not possible to set arbitrary time deadlines, but the first phase at least is thinking of doing as much of this as possible in the next year.

Q: In the many months since the various targets and goals of this program were laid out, the situation on the ground, particularly in Southern Colombia, has changed substantially. There are, according to U.S. officials as well as Colombian officials, many more FARC and AUC members there with heavier armament. At the same time, the program -- the alternative development program -- has been shrunk by the Colombian Government from what they originally envisioned its first stages to be. And other than a few very isolated places, there aren't contracts signed and there have not been actual facts on the ground to speak of.

UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: No, all of that is true. The real elements of this that are important to keep in mind is that, as a result of the increased presence of both the AUC and the FARC, both of whom happen to be fighting with each other, the government has increased its presence very significantly on the ground. There is no question at all that pilot programs were envisaged to be beginning about now, late November/early December. That has not been delayed.

But the presence of the armed units of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries is going to make it more difficult to start more than a few pilot projects. The government was enthusiastic that there would be no armed opposition. We, in our own judgments in the United States, were less convinced, unfortunately. I say unfortunately because it doesn't help that we turn out to be right and they have turned out to be wrong. But it was all comprehended in the planning process that this particular alternative would be one that we would have to face, and we are now facing it.

[Castaño DEA]

Q: I'd like to ask you a question about AUC paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño. There were two incidents that occurred this year involving U.S. officials that perhaps you could clarify.

One, earlier this year, two DEA special agents in Miami were suspended from active duty over allegations, including that they allegedly met with Carlos Castaño, and both the DEA informant as well as Castaño both claim that the DEA agents are trying to enlist his support in order to negotiate plea bargain agreements with Colombian traffickers.

Also, in October of this year, State Department official Phil Chicola made remarks in Bogotá that were different in tone and substance of remarks previously made by Secretary Harold Koh vis-à-vis Castaño when Chicola said that the United States supported the Castaño demand for the president of Colombia to include Castaño in peace talks with his administration.

Could you please clarify U.S. policy vis-à-vis Castaño, and tell us whether or not US officials have had contact with him and, if so, whether that contact was approved by Washington?

UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: Policy is no contact, no dealing. The report I know about of the DEA agents -- I don't know whether they actually met. I can't confirm it. If they had met -- and I can't confirm it -- it would be totally contrary to our policy. I believe Mr. Chicola was seriously misinterpreted. Mr. Koh is here if he wants to explain the policy. I believe I have explained it.

If you want to add anything, feel free, Harold.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY KOH: I feel affirmed. (Laughter.)

Q: Does the United States support Castaño's demand to be included in peace talks with the president?

UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: No.

[bilateral alliances]

Q: I'm a bit confused, Ambassador, about what you envision for a regional approach to this problem, and what is on the table at this time. In my experience, speaking with officials from these countries, as Jesus pointed out, there is a broad skepticism that we are hearing, and I'm wondering if you are hearing a different message. And what specifically are you talking about here? Are we talking about some kind of a regional military alliance? What are we looking at here in terms of the broader strategy?

UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: I think that you must first take a look at the fact that the regional effort, the $180 million, is primarily focused on counter-narcotics activities. Over $100 million in Bolivia, I think 32 million to Peru, 18 million to a group of other countries, including Panama and Ecuador and others. And the idea obviously is in each country to develop a series of programs.

If alternative development and manual eradiation will do the job, fine. If interdiction is required to stop the trafficking, to drive down the production and the process and the price eventually, we can use that. So these programs will be scaled and tuned to the needs and the potential needs of each of these countries. And I believe, as we go through these, we will be in a position to announce and give you more details on each of them.

In Peru and Bolivia, we have had traditional programs for a long period of time, and you can assume the additional funds will be used in general to support those traditional programs.

Q: But this is a bilateral approach that's --

UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: It's correctly --

Q: -- through the United States, not regional.

UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: It's a bilateral approach with the United States with each of the countries, not the creation of a large, multilateral consortium. And as far as I know now, there will be not the same emphasis on military as there is in Colombia because the problem is not the same yet as it is in Colombia.

... Q: Just to follow up on the third question. You said in your opening remarks that there had been a lot of thinking going on, as far as making the regional program the centerpiece of next year's effort, and I wasn't clear from your response whether you're intending some kind of different effort from the one you just outlined in terms of what is already in the supplemental.

UNDER SECRETARY PICKERING: I think that, as we look at it, we understand that with the increased effort in Colombia, the potential for the balloon effect increases. And therefore the need in the surrounding and nearby áreas is going to increase, and therefore enlargement of the programs through increased funding in a regional effort, but focused bilaterally in each country, is probably going to be necessary. And that is what informs our thinking in current budget planning.

Exerpt from "U.S. Drug Policy Director McCafffey Speaks on Colombia"
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/drugs/00112804.htm
28 November 2000

Colombia's drug elimination plan has a high potential for success in the first phase because drug production is concentrated in the south and vulnerable to eradication. In the long term, Plan Colombia will succeed because it works at the village and farm cooperative level to introduce programs to support the evolution away from a drug economy. These programs include infrastructure development for marketing legitimate crops and technical assistance for the grass-roots organizations that contract for a program of verified voluntary coca reduction. This approach was successful in Peru and Bolivia once those countries could provide basic security for the civilian programs and there was a reasonable threat of eradication without compensation for organizations that fail to keep their promises to eliminate drug crops.

From: Paul Wolf paulwolf@icdc.com Más información - Further information - Plus d'information